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Abstract—Contemporary Web-based electronic markets re-
flect the dominating content-based systems approach of Web
2.0. Though useful, these electronic markets are far from being
believable trading places. Marketplace is where things and
traders have presence, constituting a rich interaction space.
The believability of the place depends on the believability
of the presence and interactions in it, including the players’
behaviour and the narrative scenarios of the marketplace. This
paper discusses what constitutes the believability of electronic
marketplaces and presents the technologies that support it. Be-
lievability of electronic marketplaces can be described through
three metaphors: “marketplaces where people are”, “market-
places that are alive and engaging”, and “market places where
information is valuable and useful”. The paper presents the
core technologies that enable the perceivable believability of
electronic marketplaces. It describes a demonstrable prototype
of a Web-based electronic marketplace that integrates these
technologies. This is part of a larger project that aims to make
informed automated trading an enjoyable reality of Web 3.0.
Keywords-trading environments; virtual spaces; believability;
I. INTRODUCTION
A market is commonly defined as a physical or virtual
location, where price is determined and buy and sell orders
are matched to create trades according to a set of rules
that govern the processing of these orders [1]. Electronic
markets have been viewed as information systems ”that
allow buyers and vendors to exchange information about
prices and product offerings [2]. This and similar views have
guided the development of “soulless” electronic markets,
focussed primarily on enabling standardised or complex
transaction processes. Thus automation of electronic mar-
kets have been focused on the secure backend transac-
tion processing. A recent review of the area (see Chapter
18 “Electronic Marketplaces and Resource Exchanges” in
[3]) provides a broader picture from various perspectives,
including agent-based negotiation, brokering, and partner-
ship formation. Still, the operation and the interactions in
such Web-based electronic markets reflect the dominating
content-based systems approach of Web 2.0. Though useful,
these electronic markets are far from being believable trading
places.
In this paper we consider electronic (virtual) marketplace
to be a regulated space populated by computerised players
that represent a variety of human and software traders,
intermediaries, and information and infrastructure providers.
Such marketplace is where things and traders have pres-
ence, constituting a rich interaction space [4]. The agreed
regulations operating in the space structure the interactions
between the different contributors. We borrow the metaphor
from [5].
Believable electronic marketplaces are perceived as “mar-
ketplaces that are alive and engaging, marketplaces where
people are. Further we discuss what constitutes the believ-
ability of an electronic marketplace.
A. Believability
The notion of believability originated in the creation of
human-like computerised agents – virtual humans, which is
an active area of research at the crisp of computer science
and psychology. It attempts to model the full richness
of interactions including natural language communication,
gestures, and emotional expression, as well as the cognitive
apparatus that underlies these capabilities [6]. Most virtual
human research has focused on the cognitive behaviour on
the source side of the interaction [7] with a recent shift
towards the “recipient” [8].
Earlier research in believability has been heavily in-
fluenced by the Carnegie-Mellon set of requirements for
believable agents, which is based on research in drama and
story telling [9]. These include personality, self-motivation,
change, social relationships, and “illusion of life”. Personal-
ity infuses everything that a character does - their behaviour,
style, “thought”, “emotion”, e.g. their unique ways of doing
things. Self-motivation assumes that agents have their own
internal drives and desires which they pursue whether or not
others are interacting with them, and they demonstrate their
motivation. Change implies that characters change with time,
in a manner consistent with their personality. Behaviour of
agents and interactions between them should be in a manner
consistent with their social relationships (in turn, these
relationships change as a result of the interaction). “Illusion
of life” is used as a label for a collection of features such as:
pursuing multiple, simultaneous goals and actions, having
elements of broad capabilities (e.g. movement, perception,
memory, language), and reacting quickly to stimuli in the
environment. In this sense believable does not necessarily
mean realistic.
B. Believability of electronic markets
In order to address believability aspects of electronic
trading, our work extends Carnegie-Mellon set of features
with attributes that relate believability of electronic trading
to regulations, processes, spaces, interactions and narrative.
We discuss briefly the issues in each of these categories.
Regulations: Norms are part of interactions between
trading partners. Collectively they constitute a complex,
structured, regulatory system that should be consistent. In
a believable trading environment, in addition to compliance
with regulations, some times there could be some modi-
fications based on mutual agreements. Background details
to the operationalisation of norms in 3D virtual spaces are
considered in [10].
Processes: In terms of believability, the structure of the
business processes in electronic markets define the narrative
of the marketplace. Market players operate in the context of
the process structures under the constraints of the regulatory
framework.
Spaces: Humans are embodied in space in all their be-
haviour. They inhabit and operate in it; rely on and use
various cues related to space, like pointing and referring
to areas of and things in it (for more details see the first
two chapters in [11]). This is an essential factor driving
the technological conquest for moving us from being on
the Internet to gradually being in the Internet space, i.e.
towards what is labelled 3D Internet [12]. The evolution
relies on several technologies that enable primarily per-
ceptual immersion, including virtual worlds and immersive
access to digital content [13]). In terms of believability of
electronic environments, the virtual space is essential part of
what constitutes an intelligent environment populated with
intelligent artefacts. Intuitively, to be believable electronic
markets should have arrangement of their virtual spaces that
are aligned with the business processes in them.
Interactions: Believability of interactions goes beyond
traditional focus on modeling the visual presence and com-
munication style (e.g. short vs long utterances, usage of
specific vocabulary) of the agents. As a result of their
capability to dig out and paste together various pieces
of useful information, traders usually are informed to a
different extent about various aspects of the deals they are
pursuing. When necessary they rely on various relations with
other traders that they have established over the time. Their
decisions are result of the mix of being rational, informed,
impulsive, and the ability to influence others and cope with
the influences from others. All these nuances impact the
richness of market interactions, hence, must be taken into
account when considering the believability of interactions
in electronic markets.
This paper presents the core technologies developed to
address these issues. It describes the underlying theoret-
ical and practical solutions of demonstrable prototype of
a Web-based electronic marketplace. Section II considers
the methodology and mechanisms that enable believable
regulated virtual spaces. Section III presents the machinery
that enables market players to act believably in the uncer-
tain, diverse and very dynamic environment of Web-based
electronic marketplaces. As the machinery, based on the
information-based agency [14], relies on information, Sec-
tion IV discusses the mechanisms of information requesting,
mining and delivery as process, without the details of the
mining agents, which were presented in our earlier works.
II. BELIEVABLE REGULATED VIRTUAL SPACES
In order to address regulatory requirements that operate in
real world research in multiagent systems adapted social sci-
ence theories and concepts like norms [15]. Normative mul-
tiagent systems relate agent theory and the social sciences
such as sociology, philosophy, economics, and legal science.
The electronic institutions (EI) methodology and technology
for normative multi-agent systems (MAS), developed by
IIIA CSIC in Barcelona [16], elegantly formalises and
implements the institutional approach for MAS. The work on
virtual institutions (VI) [10] developed the institutional ap-
proach further for inhabited 2D and 3D spatial environments,
including virtual worlds. The VI concept and development
methodology [10] extends the EI approach, enabling the
implementation of institutional commitments that ensure rich
and reliable interaction between embodied entities - avatars,
whether they are driven by autonomous agents or humans.
Central to the implementation of institutional behavioural
norms in the EI methodology is the notion of performative
structure which formalises processes in terms of scenes,
agent roles and communication language. A set of (business)
processes are modeled as a discrete collection of interlinked
ordered scenes. The involvement of participants (agents) in
these processes is modeled through a set of roles, where roles
are related to the scenes by the set of participation rights
(constraints) for each role in respective scenes, including
the subset of the language that can be used in each scene.
The later defines the set of permitted dialogues [16]. The
VI concept [10] enables the institutionalisation of a virtual
world with respect to a performative structure in terms of
(i) the spatial layout of the virtual world that reflects the
performative structure of the (business) processes; (ii) the
objects and avatars and their behaviour within the institution
with respect to their roles; and (iii) the rich interaction
based on natural language and embodiment of humans and
software agents in the institutionalised world.
We extend the VI methodology [10] to embed believ-
ability components. Figure 1 presents the extended method-
ology with the steps grouped into three stages. Stage 1




























considers the initial requirements engineering of the insti-
tutional environment, based on the type of the market in
consideration. This stage can generate specific requirements
towards the believability of the environment. For instance,
if the electronic market is a type of supermarket, then a
believability requirement may be the identical arrangement
of the spatial layout of the shelves and the presentation of the
goods in the same order as in the respective physical shop,
emulating what customers are used to. In a property market,
the software agent that acts on behalf of a property trader
may need to look like ”being well informed” and to have the
ability to deal with the new information that supersedes the
existing information. The set of believability requirements
usually translates into elements of the specification of the
performative structure, feeds into Stage 2 and propagates
further into the layout of the virtual institution in Stage 3.
Requirements that are mostly related to the visual presence,
like the style of movement (e.g. trajectories, gestures) as well
as believability through graphical appearance are considered
directly at Stage 3 and may require refinement of the
performative structure.
Figure 2 presents a high level view of how the VI
technology creates a regulated virtual space on the Web,
including the respective believability components as dis-
cussed in Section I-B. The topology of the space is extracted
from the performative structure and then converted into an
initial set of spatial envelopes optimally packed in a bounded
institutional space.
The technological architecture of virtual institutions that
supports believable electronic markets is shown in Figure 3.
The Normative Institutional Layer, specified by the steps in
Figure 2. Enabling the dimensions of believability in electronic markets
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”Stage 1” and Stage 2 in 1) takes care for the functioning
of the institution as a normative multi-agent system and
relies on the EIDE platform [16]. An institutional governor
agent is associated with each ’player’ G1, ..., Gn (whether
Gi is a human, a software agent, or another institution).
Together with the regulatory mechanism and the execution
state of the virtual institution it ensures that the player
operates according to the regulatory protocols in each step
of the business process. The Intercommunication layer and
the Translation Layer enable the causal connection between
the institutional infrastructure and the 3D Institutional layer,
transforming the actions in the 3D Institutional Layer into
messages in the language of the Normative Institution Layer
and and vice versa. The role of the Translation Layer is
to process interactive 3D content, compliant with the X3D
standard [17] and translate it to different virtual world
platforms (currently - SecondLife [18]).
III. BELIEVABLE MARKET PLAYERS
A. Acting Believably
It is one thing for an agent to appear to be believable, or
to move in a believable way, but another for it to interact
to interact in a believable way. For an agent’s utterances to
be believable it must act in a way that demonstrates that it
understands:
• the significance of each of its utterances to the observer
• that on-going interaction are seen as relationships with
the other agents that carry implied social obligations to
act appropriately
• what it should not do
A formal model is described that addressed these issues
that is based on the observation that an agents beliefs and
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understanding are necessarily uncertain.
1) Foundation: Uncertain Beliefs: As illustrated in Figure
4, this discussion is from the point of view of an information-
based agent α in a multiagent system where α interacts with
negotiating agents, βi, information mining agents, θj via
information providing agent ε, and an institutional agent,
ξ, that represents the institution where we assume that all
interactions happen [19]: {α, β1, . . . , βo, ξ, ε, θ1, . . . , θt}.
A pair of agents interact by passing messages to each
other. We assume that they share a common ontology and
that their interactions are organised into dialogues, where a
dialogue is a finite sequence of inter-related utterances. A
commitment is a consequence of an utterance by an agent
that contains a promise that the world will be in some state
in the future. A contract is a pair of commitments exchanged
between a pair1 of agents. The set of all dialogues between
two agents up to the present is their relationship.
We represent commitments using conditional probabili-
ties, P(ϕ′|ϕ). If ϕ is a commitment that is expected to be
fulfilled to some degree, and ϕ′ the corresponding subse-
quent enactment then P(ϕ′|ϕ) is the probability that ϕ′ will
be observed given that ϕ was expected. For example, if ϕ is
a commitment signed by β then the conditional probability,
P(ϕ′|ϕ), is an estimate of α’s expectation of β’s execution
of that commitment, and the uncertainty in β’s execution of
his commitments is the entropy H(ϕ′|ϕ).
In a multiagent system it is natural to measure the
uncertainty of a random variable in terms of the cost, in
some sense, of communicating the true value of it from one
agent to another. One such sense is the lower bound on
the number of binary questions that are always guaranteed
to discover the true value of a random variable, X; this is
given by the entropy, H(X) =
∑
i−pi log pi, where the pi
are values of the probability mass function for X , [20].
Agent α’s world model, Mt, at time t is a set of random
variables, Mt = {Xi, . . . , Xn} each representing an aspect
of the world that α is interested in. In the absence of new
information the integrity of Mt should decrease in time. α
may have background knowledge concerning the expected
probability mass function for a variable X as t → ∞.
Such background knowledge is represented as a decay limit
distribution. Given a probability mass function, P(Xi), for
variable Xi, and a decay limit distribution D(Xi):
Pt+1(Xi) = di(D(Xi),Pt(Xi))
, where di is the decay function for the Xi satisfying the
property that limt→∞ Pt(Xi) = D(Xi). Either the decay
function or the decay limit distribution could also be a
function of time: dti and Dt(Xi) [14]. For simplicity we
use a linear decay function; P(Xi) decays by:
Pt+1(Xi) = λ× D(Xi) + (1− λ)× Pt(Xi) (1)
for some constant λ: 0 < λ < 1, where λ is the decay rate.
Suppose that α receives some new information in an
utterance u from agent β at time t where u states that
something is so with some probability z, and suppose that α
attaches an epistemic belief Rt(α, β, u) to u — this probabil-
ity reflects α’s level of personal caution. [14] gives a method
for estimating Rt(α, β, u) on the basis of observation. [14]
also describes how each of α’s active plans, s, contains
constructors for a set of distributions {Xi} ∈ Mt together
with associated update functions, Js(·), such that JXis (u)
is a set of linear constraints on the posterior distribution
for Xi. Let Pt(Xi,(u)) be the distribution with minimum
1Sets of commitments between more than two agents are beyond the
scope of the paper.
relative entropy with respect to the prior Pt(Xi) subject to
the constraints JXis (u). Then let Pt(Xi,(u)) =
Rt(α, β, u)× Pt(Xi,(u)) + (1− Rt(α, β, u))× Pt(Xi,(u))
The posterior Pt+1(Xi) is Pt(Xi,(u)) as long as Pt(Xi,(u))
is “more interesting2” than Pt(Xi), otherwise it is the prior.
This process takes account of both the belief Rt(α, β, u),
and the probability z that will be represented in JXis (u). The
update functions, J , are the bridge between the illocutionary
language and the agent’s world model.
In his 1957 paper [21], E.T. Jaynes wrote: “Information
theory . . . leads to a type of statistical inference which is
called the maximum entropy estimate. It is the least biased
estimate possible on the given information; i.e., it is max-
imally noncommittal with regard to missing information.”
Entropy-based inference is a form of Bayesian inference that
is convenient when the data is sparse [22] and encapsulates
common-sense reasoning [23]. It has three difficulties. First,
it assumes that what the agent knows is “the sum total of
the agent’s knowledge, it is not a summary of the agent’s
knowledge, it is all there is” [23] — this assumption is
referred to as Watt’s Assumption [24]. Second, it may only
be applied to a consistent set of beliefs. Third, its knowledge
base is expressed in first-order logic, and so probability
distributions are built over finite sample spaces. The way in
which the sample space is chosen will affect the inferences
drawn — this is referred to as representation dependence
[25]. Despite these difficulties, maximum entropy inference
is an elegant formulation of common sense reasoning that
is useful when data is sparse.
2) The significance of utterances: If β passes an utterance
to α, α evaluates this act in two ways. First, it is valued for
the strategic significance of the information that it contains,
precisely it is measured as the expected increase in utility
that α expects to enjoy given that it has the information
— this is the utilitarian measure. Second, it is valued
because the sending agent was prepared to divulge the
information in the utterance, precisely it is measured as the
decrease in uncertainty that the receiving agent has over the
sending agent’s private information — this is the information
measure. All utterances received are qualified by α with a
belief probability as described in Section III-A1.
From α’s point of view, β’s private information is every-
thing that β knows and that α does not know with certainty.
Due to the persistent effect of Equation 1, this will include
much of what β knows.
An agent may wish to decide which action, {ai}, to take
where the payoff depends on which state, {sj}, the world
is in when the action is taken (possibly in the future). The
payoff, ~vi, from taking action ai is a vector where vij will
be the payoff from taking action ai and the state of the world
is sj . Let ~p be the probability mass function of a random
2One simple criterion is: H(Mt+1) < H(Mt).
variable representing the prior expectation about the state
of the world when the action is taken. Then the expected
monetary value gained by choosing action ai is mi = ~p · ~vi.
Armed with this information suppose that the agent ap-
plies some decision criterion, c, to decide what to do —
perhaps c will choose the action with the greatest expected
payoff: arg maxi ~p · ~vi. Now suppose that the agent receives
information in an utterance u that enables him to refine his
expectation of the state of the world when the action is to
be taken (~p|u), and that he applies the same criterion c.
Then one utilitarian value of utterance u to criterion c is the
difference between the payoffs of the respective outcomes.
For each state of the world sj let bj = maxi vij i.e. bj is
the ‘best’ action that the agent can take if the state of the




this is an upper limit on the total value of all possible
utterances with respect to the application of criterion c.
Utilitarian measures of information are expressed in terms
of: if you know information x when applying criterion y to
determine which action to perform then you will gain utility
z over not knowing x [26]. That is, they are defined in the
context of some decision making act — they do not place
an intrinsic value on information. So if an agent learns x at
time t and is unaware of what future decisions he will make
that will benefit from knowing x, then he will be unable
to value x until he knows what those future decisions are.
But, by the time he is aware of all of those decisions it may
not be possible to reconstruct with certainty how he and the
other agents would have behaved if he had not known x at
time t. In summary, it is only possible to attach an intrinsic
utilitarian value to information when the future decisions
that are relevant to it are known.
We have described the value gained by acquiring infor-
mation, we now consider the value lost by an agent’s private
information becoming public knowledge — that is, known to
all agents in the system. Once information becomes public
knowledge it has no tradable value until the integrity of the
public’s belief of it decays in time.
Utilitarian measures of information may be used when all
the relevant future decisions are either known with certainty
or a probability distribution expressing their likeliness to
occur is known.
α’s world model,Mt, is a set of probability distributions.
If at time t, α receives an utterance u that may alter
this world model (as described in Section III-A1) then the
(Shannon) information in u with respect to the distributions
in Mt is: I(u) = H(Mt) − H(Mt+1). Let N t ⊆ Mt be
α’s model of agent β. If β sends the utterance u to α then
the information about β within u is: H(N t) − H(N t+1).
We give structure to the measurement of information using
an illocutionary framework to categorise utterances, and an
ontology.
The illocutionary framework will depend on the nature
of the interactions between the agents. The LOGIC frame-
work for argumentative negotiation [27] is based on five
categories: Legitimacy of the arguments, Options i.e. deals
that are acceptable, Goals i.e. motivation for the negotiation,
Independence i.e: outside options, and Commitments that
the agent has including its assets. The LOGIC framework
contains two models per agent: first α’s model of β’s private
information, and second, α’s model of the private informa-
tion that β has about α. Generally we assume that α has
an illocutionary framework F and a categorising function
v : U → P(F) where U is the set of utterances. The
power set, P(F), is required as some utterances belong to
multiple categories. For example, in the LOGIC framework
the utterance “I will not pay more for Protos3 than the
price that John charges” is categorised as both Option and
Independence.
We assume an ontology, and O denotes its concepts that
are organised in an is-a hierarchy.4 δ measures the semantic
distance between two concepts c1 and c2, for example [28]:
δ(c1, c2) = e−κ1l ·
eκ2h − e−κ2h
eκ2h + e−κ2h
where l is the shortest path between the concepts, h is the
depth of the deepest concept subsuming both concepts, and
κ1 and κ2 are parameters scaling the contribution of shortest
path length and depth respectively.
3) Acting to Respect Social Obligations: In [27] two
central concepts are used to describe relationships and
dialogues between a pair of agents. These are intimacy —
degree of closeness, and balance — degree of fairness. Both
of these concepts are summary measures of relationships
and dialogues, and are expressed in the LOGIC framework
as 5× 2 matrices.
More generally, the intimacy of α’s relationship with βi,
Iti , measures the amount that α knows about βi’s private
information and is represented as real numeric values over
G = F×O. Suppose α receives utterance u from βi and that
category f ∈ v(u). For any concept c ∈ O, define ∆(u, c) =
maxc′∈u δ(c′, c). Denote the value of Iti in position (f, c) by
Iti(f,c) then:
Iti(f,c) = ρ× I
t−1
i(f,c) + (1− ρ)× I(u)×∆(u, c)
for any c, where ρ is the discount rate. The balance of α’s
relationship with βi, Bti , is the element by element numeric
difference of Iti and α’s estimate of βi’s intimacy on α.
[29] describes measures of: trust (in the execution of
contracts), honour (validity of argumentation), and reliability
(of information). The execution of contracts, soundness
of argumentation and correctness of information are all
3A fine wine from the ‘Ribera del Duero’ region, Spain.
4A simplified way of understanding an utterance u is as a set of concepts
in O, that is u = {ci | ci ∈ O}.
represented as conditional probabilities P(ϕ′|ϕ) where ϕ is
an expectation of what may occur, and ϕ′ is the subsequent
observation of what does occur.
[14] describes a single computational framework for these
three measures that summarise α’s observations of β’s
behaviour. One of these summary measures is:






where the “1” is an arbitrarily chosen constant being the
maximum value that this measure may have, and PtI(ϕ′|ϕ, e)
is a distribution of enactments that represent α’s “ideal” in
the sense that it is the best that α could reasonably expect
to happen in context e. If α repeatedly observes ϕ′ then the
amount of information that those observations convey about
the associated commitments, ϕ, is the mutual information:
I(ϕ′;ϕ) = H(ϕ′) − H(ϕ′|ϕ), this measures the mutual
dependence of the two variables, where I(ϕ′;ϕ) = I(ϕ;ϕ′).
These summary measures are all abstracted using the
ontology; for example, “What is my trust of John for the
supply of red wine?”. These measures are also used to
summarise the information in some of the categories in the
illocutionary framework. For example, if these measures are
used to summarise estimates Pt(ϕ′|ϕ) where ϕ is a deep
motivation of β’s (i.e. a Goal), or a summary of β’s financial
situation (i.e. a Commitment) then this contributes to a sense
of trust at a deep social level.
4) Knowing what not to do: [27] advocates the controlled
revelation of information as a way of managing the intensity
of relationships. In Section III-A2 we noted that informa-
tion that becomes public knowledge is worthless, and so
respect of confidentiality is vital to maintaining the value
of revealed private information. We have not yet described
how to measure the extent to which one agent respects
the confidentiality of another agent’s information — that
is, the strength of belief that another agent will respect the
confidentially of my information: both by not passing it on,
and by not using it so as to disadvantage me.
Consider the motivating example, α sells a case of Protos
to β at cost, and asks β to treat the deal in confidence.
Moments later another agent β′ asks α to quote on a case
of Protos — α might then reasonably increase his belief in
the proposition that β had spoken to β′. Suppose further that
α quotes β′ a fair market price for the Protos and that β′
rejects the offer — α may decide to further increase this
belief. Moments later β offers to purchase another case of
Protos for the same cost. α may then believe that β may
have struck a deal with β′ over the possibility of a cheap
case of Protos.
Confidentiality is the mirror image of trust, honour and
reliability that are all built by an agent “doing the right
thing” — respect for confidentiality is built by an agent
not doing the wrong thing. As human experience shows,
validating respect for confidentiality is a tricky business. One
proactive ploy is to start a false rumour (e.g. “My wife is
a matador.”) and to observe how it spreads. The following
reactive approach builds on the Protos example above.
An agent will know when it passes confidential infor-
mation to another, and it is reasonable to assume that the
significance of the act of passing it on decreases in time. In
this simple model we do not attempt to value the information
passed as in Section III-A2. We simply note the amount of
confidential information passed and observe any indications
of a breach of confidence.
If α sends utterance u to β “in confidence”, then u is
categorised as f as described in Section III-A2. Cti measures
the amount of confidential information that α passes to βi
in a similar way to the intimacy measure Iti described in
Section III-A2:
Cti(f,c) = ρ× C
t−1
i(f,c) + (1− ρ)×∆(u, c)
for any c where ρ is the discount rate; if no information is
passed at time t then:
Cti(f,c) = ρ× C
t−1
i(f,c)
Cti represents the time-discounted amount of confidential
information passed in the various categories.
α constructs a companion framework to Cti , L
t
i is as esti-
mate of the amount of information leaked by βi represented
in G. Having confided u in βi, α designs update functions
JLu for the L
t
i. In the absence of evidence imported by the
JLu functions, each value in L
t
i decays by:
Lti(f,c) = ξ × L
t−1
i(f,c)
where ξ is in [0, 1] and probably close to 1. The JLu
functions scan every observable utterance, u′, from each
agent β′ for evidence of leaking the information u, JLu (u
′) =
P(β′ knows u | u′ is observed). As previously:
Lti(f,c) = ξ × L
t−1





This simple model estimates Cti the amount of confiden-
tial information passed, and Lti the amount of presumed
leaked, confidential information represented over G. As with
most things that information-based agents do, the ‘magic’ is
in the specification of the JLu functions. A more exotic model
would estimate “who trusts who more than who with what
information” — this is what we have elsewhere referred to as
a trust network. The feasibility of modelling a trust network
depends substantially on how much detail each agent can
observe in the interactions between other agents.
IV. BELIEVABLY INFORMED: INFORMATION MINING
AND DELIVERY
Being (well) informed affects the decision making of α,
hence, it is another key component of believability discussed
in this paper. In the current model information u that α
Figure 5. Example of a tree-structured domain of a taxonomic variable
red wine
Ribera del Duero Priorat
{Pingus, 95} {Protos, 04}{Unico, 04} {Clos Erasmus, 04} {Anastasio, 05} {La Basseta, 05}
region
name, year
receives from β, includes fact φ with probability z = P(φ).
When operating on the Web, a more sophisticated estimate
of the epistemic belief Rt(α, β, u) can accommodate related
information from Web sources. Technically, α sends a re-
quest for information IRt = {φ,OΦ,Lt, q}, which includes
the fact φ, the ontology OΦ, level of agreement Lt be-
tween collected information about φ from different external
sources, and a parameter q which tells information providing
agent θj the representation form of the information. From
information mining point of view OΦ can be viewed as
a constraint on the tree-structured domain of a taxonomic
variable Φ. This limits the size of the ontology with which
the information providing agent operates. For instance, α
can request from ε information on the standing of Protos
wine, mentioned in Section III-A2, among other Spanish red
wines that can be formulated in terms of “identify the top
three wines in the region of ‘Ribera del Duero and the wines
closest to those wines from another region”. ε decomposes
such request into information mining tasks (e.g ”identify
top three red wines in a region”, ”cluster the closest ranked
wines from two regions”) and pass respective requests
to {θ1, . . . , θt}. A view of the results obtained by a θj
information mining agent in our example is shown in figure
5. In order to combine it with similar results delivered by
{θ1, . . . , θt}, ε uses De Carvalho’s agreement/disagreement
indices [30] - if the value is acceptable with respect to
α′s required level of agreement Lt then the information is
passed to α translated in the form specified by q (currently
in probabilistic form), where it is used to refine epistemic
belief Rt(α, β, u).
V. CONCLUSIONS
The evolution of the electronic market places is an in-
trinsic part of the evolution of the Web, hence, it will be
essential in Web 3.0 technology. When Web 2.0 is centered
around humans engagement, interaction and sharing, we
view the forthcoming Web 3.0 to be about placing humans
“within” an intelligently behaving Web. Consequently, the
notion of believability, discussed in this paper, is essential to
Web 3.0. Central to this notion is believable agent behaviour,
including the smart ways of gaining advantage from being
well informed and the ability to utilise relevant information.
We also discussed the enabling technology. At the end we
would like to sum up believability using Gary Kasparov’s
quotation “I sensed an alien intelligence in the program.”
after the 1997 defeat of the world chess champion by the
computer program Deep Blue II (as quoted in [31]).
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